Human Rights Abuses Inside the Mojahedin Khalq Camps
|
The Mojahedin Khalq Organization
(MKO) is an armed Iranian opposition group that was formed in
1965. An urban guerrilla group fighting against the government
of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, it was an active participant in the
anti-monarchy struggle that resulted in the 1979 Iranian
revolution. 1
After the revolution, the MKO
expanded its organizational infrastructure and recruited many
new members. However it was excluded from participating in power
sharing arrangements, and the new revolutionary government under
the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini forced it underground after
it instigated an armed uprising against the government in June
1981. The majority of its top cadres went into exile in France.
In France, the MKO continued its active opposition to Iran’s
government. In 1986, under pressure from the French authorities,
the MKO relocated to Iraq. There it established a number of
military camps under the banner of the National Liberation Army
and maintained an armed presence inside Iraq until the fall of
Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the MKO
fighters made regular incursions into Iranian territory and
fought against Iranian government forces. After the end of
Iran-Iraq war, the group’s armed activities decreased
substantially as Saddam Hussein’s government curtailed the MKO’s
ability to launch attacks inside Iranian territory.
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime
in April 2003 put an end to Iraqi financial and logistical
support of the MKO. The MKO fighters remained neutral during the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. After the occupation of Iraq, the
U.S. military disarmed the MKO fighters and confined them inside
their main camp known as Camp Ashraf. 2
U.S. military sources told Human Rights Watch that as of March
10, 2005, there were 3,534 MKO members inside Camp Ashraf.3
Some MKO fighters took advantage of
an amnesty offer by the Iranian government. Since October 2004,
273 MKO members have returned to Iran. 4
The U.S. military has recognized the MKO fighters in Iraq as
Protected Persons under the Geneva Conventions.5
Their fate remains uncertain; the Iraqi government and the U.S.
military appear not to have reached a decision regarding their
future.
During Saddam Hussein’s last year
in power, some Iranians held in Abu Ghraib prison were
repatriated to Iran in exchange for Iraqi prisoners of war
(POWs). These were dissident members of the MKO who had been
sent by the organization for “safekeeping” in Abu Ghraib. 6
The release of these prisoners in 2002-2003 provided a direct
window into conditions inside the MKO camps that was previously
inaccessible to the outside world.
Human Rights Watch interviewed five
of these former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison.
Their testimonies, together with testimonies collected from
seven other former MKO members, paint a grim picture of how the
organization treated its members, particularly those who held
dissenting opinions or expressed an intent to leave the
organization.
The former MKO members reported
abuses ranging from detention and persecution of ordinary
members wishing to leave the organization, to lengthy solitary
confinements, severe beatings, and torture of dissident members.
The MKO held political dissidents in its internal prisons during
the 1990s and later turned over many of them to Iraqi
authorities, who held them in Abu Ghraib. In one case, Mohammad
Hussein Sobhani was held in solitary confinement for
eight-and-a-half years inside the MKO camps, from September 1992
to January 2001.
The witnesses reported two cases of
deaths under interrogation. Three dissident members—Abbas
Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari—witnessed
the death of a fellow dissident, Parviz Ahmadi, inside their
prison cell in Camp Ashraf. Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human Rights
Watch that he also witnessed the death of another prisoner,
Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an
interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with
Sadeghinejad.
The MKO’s leadership consists of
the husband and wife team of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi. Their
marriage in 1985 was hailed by the organization as the beginning
of a permanent “ideological revolution.” 7
Various phases of this “revolution” include: divorce by decree
of married couples, regular writings of self-criticism reports,
renunciation of sexuality, and absolute mental and physical
dedication to the leadership.8
The level of devotion expected of members was in stark display
in 2003 when the French police arrested Maryam Rajavi in Paris.
In protest, ten MKO members and sympathizers set themselves on
fire in various European cities; two of them subsequently died.9
Former members cite the implementation of the “ideological
revolution” as a major source of the psychological and physical
abuses committed against the group’s members.
At present, the MKO is listed as a
terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department and several
European governments. The MKO’s leadership is engaged in an
extensive campaign aimed at winning support from Western
politicians in order to have the designation of a terrorist
organization removed. 10
Human Rights Watch interviewed by
telephone twelve former members of the MKO living in Europe.
These witnesses provided credible claims that they were
subjected to imprisonment as well as physical and psychological
abuses because they had either expressed criticism of the MKO’s
policies or had requested to leave the organization’s military
camps.
Each witness was interviewed
separately several times between February and May 2005. All
witnesses are currently living in Europe. More than twelve hours
of testimonies were collected. All interviews were conducted in
Farsi. Each witness provided independent accounts of their
experience inside the MKO camps, and their testimonies
corroborated other evidence collected by Human Rights Watch. A
number of witnesses who were detained and tortured inside the
MKO camps named Hassan Ezati as one of their interrogators.
Hassan Ezati’s son, Yasser Ezati, also interviewed for this
report, confirmed his father’s identity as a MKO interrogator.
Of the twelve former MKO members
interviewed for this report, eight witnesses 11
left Iraq between 2002 and 2004. The remaining four witnesses12
left Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf War in 1991. In
addition to being held in internal MKO prisons, five of the
witnesses13
were imprisoned in Abu Ghraib prison prior to their release.
[1] For a comprehensive history of the organization, see
Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989).
[2] Camp Ashraf is located near the city of al-Khalis, north
of Baghdad.
[3] Human Rights Watch e-mail interview with U.S. military
officials, March 10, 2005.
[4] According to U.S. military sources, twenty-eight members
were repatriated in December 2004, thirteen in January 2005, 100
on March 3, 2005, and 132 on March 9, 2005.
[5] “US grants protection for anti-Tehran group in Iraq,”
Reuters, 26 July, 2004.
[6] Former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison
told Human Rights Watch that their cell doors bore a plaque with
“Mojahedin Safekeeping” [Amanat-e Mojahedin] written on
it.
[7] Mojahed, No. 241, April 4, 1985. Mojahed
is the official publication of the MKO, and at the time it
appeared weekly.
[8] See Masoud Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel
(London: Saqi Books, 2004). On self-criticism sessions, see pp.
210-230; on decreeing of divorce, see pgs. 307-311; on
renunciation of sexuality, see pages 313-340. Immediately
following Masoud and Maryam Rajavi’s marriage, the MKO military
command issued a directive stating: “In order to carry out your
organizational duties under the present circumstances there is
an urgent need to strengthen and deepen this ideological
revolution. You must pay the necessary price by allocating
sufficient time and resources for absorbing related teachings…”
Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985. The Social Division of
MKO also issued a directive to the members stating: “To
understand this great revolution …is to understand and gain a
deep insight into the greatness of our new leadership, meaning
leadership of Masoud and Maryam. It is to believe in them as
well as to show ideological and revolutionary obedience of
them.” Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985.
[9] Arifa Akbar, “Human torches mark protest; 10 Iranian
exiles become fireballs, two die martyrs,” The Independent,
July 2, 2003.
[10] Maryam Rajavi, “Empower Iran’s opposition forces
checking the Mullahs,” International Herald Tribune,
January 28, 2005. Katherine Shrader, “Iranian Group Seeks
Legitimacy in U.S.,” Associated Press, February 24, 2005.
[11] Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Mohammad Hussein
Sobhani, and Akbar Akbari were repatriated by Iraqi officials to
Iran on January 21, 2002. Amir Mowaseghi was repatriated on
March 18, 2003. Alireza Mir Asgari was abandoned along the
Iran-Iraq border in February 2003. Yasser Ezati left Iraq in
June 2004. Abbas Sadeghinejad escaped the MKO military camp on
June 20, 2002.
[12] Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Tahereh Eskandari, Habib
Khorrami, and Karim Haqi.
[13] Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Mohammad Hussein
Sobhani, Akbar Akbari, and Amir Mowaseghi were imprisoned in Abu
Ghraib. |
The MKO was founded in September 1965 by
three graduates of Tehran University: Mohammad Hanifnezhad,
Saeed Mohsen and Asghar Badizadegan. 14
The three shared a history of political activism within the
religious-nationalist movement and its affiliated Islamic
Students Associations. They believed that opposition forces
against the Pahlavi government lacked a cohesive ideology and
required revolutionary leadership. They reasoned that peaceful
resistance against the government was fruitless, and that only a
revolutionary armed struggle could dislodge the monarchy.
The organization’s founding trio focused
their initial thrust on creating a revolutionary ideology based
on their interpretation of Islam that could fuel an armed
struggle by persuading masses of people to rise up against the
government. This ideology relied heavily on an interpretation of
Islam as a revolutionary message compatible with modern
revolutionary ideologies, particularly Marxism.
Initially, the founding members recruited
some twenty like-minded friends to form a discussion group.
Their first meeting, on September 6, 1965, in Tehran, is
considered the genesis of the MKO. The group’s discussions
centered on intense study of religion, history and revolutionary
theory. In addition to religious texts, the group also studied
Marxist theory at length. For its first three years, the group
held regular secret meetings. By 1968, these discussions led to
the creation of a Central Committee “to work out a revolutionary
strategy” and an Ideological Team “to provide the group with its
own theoretical handbooks.”
15
During its first five years, the MKO did not
carry out any operations against the government. It primarily
focused on developing a revolutionary ideology and training its
members in urban guerilla warfare. In 1970, thirteen MKO members
traveled to Jordan and Lebanon and received military training
inside Palestinian Liberation Organization camps. They returned
to Iran after a few months.
Prior to carrying out any armed activities,
the group planned to focus on developing its ideology and
training its new recruits. However, this strategy was thwarted
by the emergence of a competing Marxist guerilla group, the
Fadaian Khalq Organization. On February 8, 1971, members of the
Fadaian launched their first operation by attacking a police
station in the village of Siahkal in the northern province of
Gilan. This incident marked the emergence of armed struggle
against the shah’s government.
The MKO’s leadership, surprised by the
Siahkal incident, decided to expedite their plans for armed
operations by organizing a spectacular attack in Tehran. At this
time, the government was in the midst of promoting a large-scale
celebration marking 2500 years of monarchy in Iran. The MKO
planned a series of bombings that would target Tehran’s electric
power grids prior to the opening eve ceremonies.
During their efforts to acquire explosives,
the MKO were infiltrated by the security forces who tracked
their activities. On August 23, 1971, just days before the
scheduled onset of their first operation, thirty-five members of
the MKO were arrested by the authorities. Within the next few
months, half of MKO’s member were arrested and put on trial by a
military tribunal. “They were all accused of possessing arms,
planning to overthrow the ‘constitutional monarchy,’ and
studying such subversive authors as Marx, Mao, and Che Guevara.” 16
The three founding members of the MKO, along
with six others from the group’s Central Committee, were
sentenced to death and executed on May 25, 1972. Only two
members of the Central Committee, Masoud Rajavi and Bahman
Bazargani, escaped firing squads when their death sentences were
commuted to life imprisonment.
The 1971-72 waves of arrests, executions and
imprisonments dealt a severe blow to the MKO, but its remaining
members who escaped detection by the security forces continued
to recruit new members as well as carrying out a number of armed
operations. In 1975, intense ideological differences among the
MKO members led to the departure of a sizable number of members,
who argued that religious thought was incompatible with
revolutionary struggle. This offshoot of the MKO was briefly
known as the Marxist Mojahedin and was later renamed Peykar
Organization. The MKO members who stayed loyal to the group’s
original ideology referred to this event as an internal coup.
On the eve of the 1979 Iranian revolution,
the imprisoned MKO members were released along with other
political prisoners. The group quickly turned its attention to
building a nation-wide organization. Masoud Rajavi emerged as
the top MKO leader. The group was particularly successful in
gaining the sympathies of middle class educated youth. It
established offices throughout Iran and built a network of
militia that were highly active inside university campuses and
high schools.
While supporting the leadership of Khomeini
in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the MKO leaders
never managed to gain his trust, and as a result were excluded
from power-sharing arrangements in the post-revolutionary
government. An intense rivalry developed between the MKO and the
Islamic Republican Party (IRP), formed by Khomeini’s disciples.
The first president of the republic,
Abol-Hasan Banisadr, elected in 1980, also faced serious
opposition from the IRP. In the first months of 1981,
differences among competing political factions reached a
critical juncture. President Banisadr came under intense
political pressure from the IRP, which controlled the parliament
and most branches of the government and security forces. The MKO
and Banisadr formed an alliance to try and thwart the IRP’s
drive to consolidate its control over every part of the state.
The MKO started its armed conflict against
the Iranian government on June 20, 1981. Thousands of its
members inside Iran were imprisoned, tortured and executed
during the 1980s. 17
In 1988, the Iranian government summarily executed thousands of
political prisoners, many of them MKO members.18
On June 19, 1981, Banisadr and Rajavi called
for massive demonstrations nationwide. They hoped to duplicate
the pattern of the anti-shah revolution by instigating a popular
uprising. On June 20, 1981, large-scale street demonstrations
were held in Tehran and many major cities. However the
authorities used Revolutionary Guards to suppress the uprising,
killing hundreds of demonstrators in street clashes.
In the aftermath of the June 20 uprising, the
MKO was forced underground and both Banisadr and Rajavi went
into hiding. A few weeks later, on July 29, 1981, Banisadr and
Rajavi fled Iran and went into exile in Paris. From this point
on, the MKO moved its headquarters to Paris and continued to
fight the Iranian government by carrying out assassinations and
bombings targeting government officials and the IRP leadership. 19
In Paris, Rajavi and Banisadr consolidated
their alliance by declaring the establishment of the National
Council of Resistance (NCR) as a coalition of opposition forces,
advertising itself as “the democratic alternative” to Iran’s
government. The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and a
number of prominent intellectuals and individuals also joined
the NCR.
However, the NCR’s role as a broad coalition
was diminished within a year of its founding. Banisadr’s
disagreements with Rajavi led to his departure in April 1984. 20
The KDPI followed suit and withdrew in 1985.21
According to Masoud Banisadr, who served as the NCR’s chief
representative in Europe and the United States until 1996, the
NCR has since functioned primarily as the political wing of the
MKO, serving the MKO’s lobbying efforts in Europe and North
America:
It was obvious to everyone but ourselves that
politically the Mojahedin had failed to create the broad
coalition Rajavi had promised….We repeated to each other that
the NCR was Rajavi’s means of staying on the political scene in
Europe and America and nothing more. Its main use was to deceive
the Americans and Europeans against thinking of us as the same
Mojahedin responsible for assassinating American citizens in
Iran… 22
The MKO’s leadership was transformed when
Masoud Rajavi announced his marriage to Maryam Uzdanlu on March
18, 1985. 23
The husband and wife team became co-leaders of the MKO. The
organization hailed their marriage as an “ideological
revolution” that was the result of an immense sacrifice made by
Masoud and Maryam Rajavi. Prior to this, Maryam Rajavi had been
married to Masoud Rajavi’s deputy, Mehdi Abrishamchi. The
leadership asked all its members to undertake their own
“ideological revolution” by identifying their personal
shortcomings in self-criticism sessions.24
Immediately following Masoud and Maryam Rajavi’s marriage, the
military command of the MKO issued a directive stating:
In order to carry out your organizational
duties under the present circumstances there is an urgent need
to strengthen and deepen this ideological revolution. You must
pay the necessary price by allocating sufficient time and
resources for absorbing related teachings…Thus in your daily
routines give priority to listening to radio messages and
explanations provided by your commanders. Believe in the central
committee’s proclamation that “this ideological revolution will
enhance the Mojahedin’s capacities enormously; it will ever more
unify and cleanse our ranks.”…Be certain that your deep belief
in the novel leadership of the new democratic revolution of the
heroic Iranian people, meaning Masoud and Maryam Rajavi, and by
making a direct connection with this leadership and setting it
as your example….you will be able to correct your work habits
and be able to deal with and resolve personal, organizational,
and military difficulties. 25
The Social Division of MKO also issued a
directive to the members initiating the self-criticism tradition
within the organization:
To understand this great revolution…is to
understand and gain a deep insight into the greatness of our new
leadership, meaning the leadership of Masoud and Maryam. It is
to believe in them as well as to show ideological and
revolutionary obedience of them…By correcting your old work
habits and by criticizing your individual as well as collective
shortcomings, we shall gain much awareness in confronting our
enemies…Report to your commanders and superiors in a
comprehensive manner your progress, its results and outcomes
that you gain from promoting and strengthening this ideological
revolution. 26
In 1986, the French government engaged in
direct talks with the Iranian government to normalize ties. As a
result of these negotiations, the French government asked Masoud
Rajavi to leave France. On June 7, 1986, he left Paris for
Baghdad. The MKO relocated many of its resources from Paris to
Iraq. On June 20, 1987, the MKO announced the formation of
National Liberation Army (NLA) inside Iraq. 27
For the next year, the NLA made several incursions into Iran as
the Iran-Iraq war was entering its eighth year. The largest
operation, code-named “Eternal Light,” took place in the
immediate aftermath of Iran’s acceptance of the U.N.-brokered
cease fire agreement on July 18, 1988 (see below).28
After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam
Hussein limited the MKO’s military activities against Iran. The
lack of military activity inside the MKO camps in Iraq coupled
with an acceleration of the “ideological revolution” led to a
rising tide of dissent inside the organization.
[14]
“For the first time in the history of the Iranian people’s
liberation struggle, an organization with a monolithic ideology,
populist ideals, and a policy of revolutionary armed resistance
was founded in September 1965.” Mojahedin Khalq Organization
Bonyangozaran, downloaded on March 10, 2005,
http://www.iran.mojahedin.org/books.htm.
See alsoErvand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New
Haven: Yale University Press), 1989.
[15]
Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, p. 89.
[16]
Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin,
[17]“Iran:
Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990,” Amnesty International,
Index: MDE 13/2/90.
[18]“Iran:
Political Executions,” Amnesty International, December
1988, Index: MDE 13/29/88. See also Ayatollah Montazeri’s
letters protesting summary executions in 1988, published in his
memoirs. Ayatollah Montazeri was Ayatollah Khomeini’s heir
apparent in 1988. Ayatollah Montazeri, Khaterat,
http://www.montazeri.ws/farsi/khaterat/fehrest.htm,
last accessed March 18, 2005.
[19]
Among the most spectacular attacks include the bombing of the
IRP headquarters in June 28, 1981 and the assassination of
President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad
Bahonar in 1981.
[20]
“Khomeini’s Foes Split,” Washington Post, April 4, 1984.
[21]
Mojahed, No. 240, March 14, 1985.
[22]
Masoud Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel (London:
Saqi Books, 2004), p. 219. Masoud Banisadr is a relative of
former president Abolhasan Banisadr.
[23]
Mojahed, No. 241, April 4, 1985.
[24]
See footnote 8.
[25]
Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985.
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
“Iran rebels form Iraq-based army,” Chicago Sun-Times,
June 20, 1987.
[28]
“Iran accepts UN truce call in eight year war with Iraq,”
Associated Press, July 19, 1988. |
|
Former MKO members interviewed for
this report cite the following reasons for their decision to
leave the organization: military failure of the MKO to dislodge
the Iranian government during the July 1988 military operation,
forced mass divorces instituted as part of the “ideological
revolution” and their persecution and torture by the MKO
operatives during “security clearances” in 1994-1995. These
three developments are discussed below.
The MKO trained its fighters under
the banner of the National Liberation Army (NLA) inside Iraq.
The NLA established several military camps in Iraq and trained
thousands of guerrilla fighters to fight against the Iranian
regime.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the NLA
fighters regularly attacked Iranian troops along the Iran-Iraq
border and made several incursions into Iran. The largest
operation by the NLA took place after Iran accepted U.N.
resolution 598, calling for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq.
Iran accepted the U.N. resolution on July 18, 1988. The NLA
forces, estimated at nearly 7,000 fighters, were immediately
mobilized for an attack on Iran. This operation was named
Eternal Light.
The MKO’s leadership, believing
that the Iranian government was weak and susceptible to a
popular uprising, reasoned that an incursion by the NLA forces
would incite such an uprising and would pave the way for their
forces to march to Tehran and bring down the government. On the
eve of launching the operation, Masoud Rajavi told his troops:
We will not be fighting alone; we
will have the people on our side. They are tired of this regime,
and especially since the ceasefire, they have every incentive to
get rid of it forever. We will only have to act as their
shields, protecting them from being easy targets for the
[revolutionary] guards. Wherever we go there will be masses of
citizens joining us, and the prisoners we liberate from jails
will help us lead them towards victory. It will be like an
avalanche, growing as it progresses. Eventually the avalanche
will tear Khomeini’s web apart. You don’t need to take anything
with you. We will be like fish swimming in a sea of people. They
will give you whatever you need. 29
On July 24, 1988, the NLA fighters
left their camps crossing the Iranian border at Khosravi
checkpoint. 30
They initially met little resistance as they approached the
provincial capital of Kermanshah, nearly 100 miles inside
Iranian territory. But Iran’s military and Revolutionary Guard
responded massively to defend Kermanshah, forcing the NLA
fighters to retreat towards the Iraqi border after suffering
heavy losses.31
According to Masoud Banisadr:
About ten years later, when the
organization published names and photographs of martyrs from the
operation for the first time, the number of martyred was
announced as 1,304. Our other losses were officially 1,100
injured, of whom 11 subsequently died. 32
The NLA’s defeat was a defining
moment for many of its fighters who realized their military
might was far from sufficient to overthrow Iran’s government.
“The level of pessimism and lack of trust in Rajavi’s leadership
was rising daily. Many were asking to leave the organization.
Our broken spirits and injured bodies were a sign of the NLA’s
tactical and strategic defeat,” wrote Mohammad Reza Eskandari,
another former MKO member who was injured during the operation. 33
Masoud Banisadr also recalled the
aftermath of the operation as a significant turning point for
many MKO members:
Operation Forogh [Eternal Light]
dashed our political hopes. Worse, it signified the end of
ideology, of moral belief and expectation –for me and, as I soon
discovered, many others. Our basic values no longer had any
meaning and ceased to sustain us. We had all become actors
playing to each other, encouraged by each other. This lie
reached its intolerable climax when our “ideological leader”
failed to admit his predictions and judgment had been
wrong…once, we had been told that belief in Mojahedin was based
on two premises: the sacrifice they were willing to make and
their honesty. After Forogh the well of honesty completely dried
up, and from then on the organization rested on only one
foundation: “sacrifice” and more “sacrifice.” 34
The “sacrifice” required of the
members was articulated in a series of “ideological revolutions”
promoted by the leadership. 35
The leadership asked the members to divorce themselves from all
physical and emotional attachments in order to enhance their
“capacity for struggle.” In case of married couples, this phase
of the “ideological revolution” required them to renounce their
emotional ties to their spouses through divorce. Masoud Banisadr
reports how this process unfolded during an “ideological meeting
for ‘executive and high ranking members’” following MKO’s defeat
in Iran:
The first thing I was required to
do in Baghdad was watch a videotape of an ideological meeting
for “executive and high-ranking members.” The meeting, called
“Imam Zaman,” 36
started with a simple question: “To whom do we owe all our
achievements and everything that we have?”… Rajavi did not
claim, as I thought he might, to be the Imam of our times, but
merely said we owed everything to Imam Zaman… The object was to
show that we could reach Tehran if we were more united with our
leader, as he was with Imam Zaman and God. He was ready to
sacrifice everything he had (which in fact meant all of us!) for
God, asserting that the only thing on his mind was doing the
will of God,….we were expected to draw the conclusion that no
“buffer” existed between Rajavi and Imam Zaman; yet there was a
buffer between ourselves and him [Rajavi] … which prevented us
from seeing him clearly. This “buffer” was our weakness. If we
could recognize that, we would see why and how we had failed in
Operation Forogh [Eternal Light] and elsewhere. Masoud and
Maryam [Rajavi] had no doubt that the buffer was in all our
cases our existing spouse.37
The organization’s order for “mass
divorce” caused much mental anguish and confusion. Masoud
Banisadr details the atmosphere inside Ashraf Camp during this
period:
The atmosphere on the base was
completely different….The mood was one of unremitting misery…It
seemed everyone was in the process of the new phase of the
“ideological revolution.” The only legitimate discussion was
about the revolution and the exchange of relevant experiences.
Apart from that nothing was important; there was no outside
world….Even poor single people were required to divorce their
buffers, having no idea whom that meant; apparently the answer
was to divorce all women or men for whom they harboured any
feelings of love. Only later did I realize the organization
demanded not only a legal divorce but also an emotional or
“ideological” divorce. I would have to divorce Anna [his wife]
in my heart. Indeed I would have to learn to hate her as the
buffer standing between our leader and myself.
Rajavi announced at the meeting
that as our “ideological leader” he had ordered mass divorce
from our spouses. He asked everyone to hand over our rings if we
had not already done so. That meeting was the strangest and most
repugnant I had ever attended. It went on for almost a week…. 38
During late 1994 and early 1995,
many members of the MKO were arrested by the organization’s
operatives inside their camps in Iraq. They were interrogated
and accused of spying for the Iranian government. They were
released in mid-1995 after being forced to sign false
confessions and stating their loyalty to the leadership. Five
former MKO members interviewed for this report were arrested
during this period: Farhad Javaheri-Yar, Ali Ghashghavi, Alireza
Mirasgari, Akbar Akbari, and Abbas Sadeghinejad. According to
their testimonies—detailed in the next section—the purpose of
these arrests was to intimidate dissidents and obtain false
confessions from them stating that they were agents of Iranian
government. This period was known as the “security clearance” (check-e
amniyati).
In late 1994, the organization
informed its fighters in Iraq of its plans to send small teams
of fighters into Iran to carry out operations. Farhad
Javaheri-Yar, a former member, told Human Rights Watch:
A message was broadcast on behalf
of Masoud Rajavi stating that the domestic situation in Iran was
chaotic. It called for volunteers who wanted to go inside Iran,
perform revolutionary operations and instigate people to rise
up. Many members responded immediately; long lines were formed
by applicants. The application forms were nearly forty pages
long and included hundreds of questions. 39
Another former member, Alireza
Mirasgari, told Human Rights Watch that discontent and dissent
were spreading throughout Camp Ashraf at this time:
During the second half of 1994, the
wave of questions and dissent was reaching a climax inside the
organization. Since most military activities had stopped, there
was little to do and much time to reflect. Many fighters wanted
to leave the organization. I began to note that some people
around me were “disappearing.” I was told they had left for
special operations inside Iran. However, later we found out that
they had been arrested and imprisoned inside the camp. I was
myself imprisoned in January 1995. 40
[29] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 283.
[30] “Incursion by rebels threaten cease-fire,” The
Washington Post, July 30, 1988.
[31] “Rebels routed in push for Tehran,” The Guardian,
September 6, 1988.
[32] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 292.
[33] Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Bar Ma Che Gozasht Khaterat
Yek Mojahed (Paris: Kahvaran, 2004), p. 83.
[34] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 306.
[35] The concept of ideological revolution started with the
“ideological marriage” of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi in 1985.
Subsequently, the organization required all of its members to
make an “ideological leap” by cleansing their character. This
process required all members to write self-criticism reports
outlining their character flaws and past mistakes. See footnote
8.
[36] Imam Zaman is the twelfth Shia Imam. According to the
Shia Twelver belief, Imam Zaman is the Twelfth Imam in descent
from the prophet Mohammad, who went into “occultation” in the
Tenth century and will reappear on earth as a messiah at a time
of God’s choosing.
[37] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 307.
[38] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 311.
[39] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Farhad
Javaheri-Yar, February 3, 2005.
[40] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir
Asgari, February 10, 2005. |
|
Human rights abuses carried out by
MKO leaders against dissident members ranged from prolonged
incommunicado and solitary confinement to beatings, verbal and
psychological abuse, coerced confessions, threats of execution,
and torture that in two cases led to death.
The testimonies of the former MKO
members indicate that the organization used three types of
detention facilities inside its camps in Iraq. The interviewees
described one type as small residential units, referred to as
guesthouses (mihmansara), inside the camps. The MKO
members who requested to leave the organization were held in
these units during much of which time they were kept
incommunicado. They were not allowed to leave the premises of
their unit, to meet or talk with anyone else in the camp, or to
contact their relatives and friends in the outside world.
Karim Haqi, a former high ranking
MKO member who served as the head of security for Masoud Rajavi,
told Human Rights Watch:
I was the head of security for
Masoud Rajavi in 1991. They could not believe that I wanted to
separate from the organization. I was confined inside a building
called Iskan together with my wife and our six month old
child. Iskan was the site of a series of residential
units that used to house married couples before ideological
divorces were mandated. The organization had raised a tall wall
around this area. Its interior perimeter was protected by barbed
wire, and guards kept it under surveillance from observation
towers. While we were under detention, the organization reduced
our food rations, subjected us to beatings and verbal abuses and
also intimidated us by making threats of executions. 41
Mohammad Reza Eskandari and his
wife Tahereh Eskandari, two former members of the MKO, also told
Human Rights Watch of being detained inside various guest houses
after requesting to leave the MKO in 1991:
The organization had taken our
passports and identification documents upon our arrival in the
camp. When we expressed our intention to leave, they never
returned our documents. We were held in detention centers in
Iskan as well as other locations. We were sent to a refugee
camp outside the city of Ramadi called al-Tash. Life in al-Tash
was extremely harsh, more like a process of gradual death. The
MKO operatives continued to harass us even in Al-Tash.
Eventually in September 1992, we received refugee status from
Holland and were able to leave al-Tash. 42
The second type of detention inside
the MKO camps was called bangali shodan by the witnesses,
referring to solitary confinement inside a small pre-fabricated
trailer room (bangal). Dissident members who requested to
leave the organization as well as ordinary members were detained
in the bangals. Detention inside a bangal was
considered a form of MKO punishment for members whom the
leadership considered to have made mistakes. They were expected
to reflect on their mistakes and to write self-criticism reports
while in detention.
Masoud Banisadr, formerly the top
diplomatic representative of the MKO in Europe and North
America, wrote of his experience of being detained in a
bangal when Masoud Rajavi and other high-ranking members met
with him and decided he had been “corrupted:”
Afterwards my masoul
[supervisor] advised me to go to a bungalow and think. I had
become a bangali, which meant being put in solitary
confinement, ordered to do nothing but think and write. It was
an extreme kind of mental torture, and there were members who
preferred to kill themselves than to suffer it. 43
The third type of detention
reported by the witnesses encompassed imprisonment, physical
torture and interrogations inside secret prisons within the MKO
camps. These prisons were primarily used for persecution of
political dissidents. Their existence was unknown to most
members. The witnesses who suffered under this form of detention
told Human Rights Watch that they were unaware that the
organization maintained such prisons until they experienced it
firsthand.
One of the witnesses interviewed by
Human Rights Watch, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, spent
eight-and-a-half years in solitary confinement, from September
1992 to January 2001, inside the MKO camps. Another witness,
Javaheri-Yar, underwent five years of solitary confinement in
the MKO prisons, from November 1995 to December 2000. Both were
high-ranking members who intended to leave the organization but
were told that, because of their extensive inside knowledge,
they could not be allowed to do so. They were imprisoned and
eventually transferred to the Iraqi authorities, who then held
them in Abu Ghraib.
Four other witnesses Human Rights
Watch interviewed were detained during the “security clearances”
of 1994-1995 because they were suspected by the MKO of harboring
dissident views. Ali Ghasghavi, Alireza Mir Asgari, Ali Akbari,
and Abbas Sadeghinejad were severely tortured, subjected to
harsh interrogation techniques and forced to sign false
confessions stating their links to Iranian intelligence agents.
Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi,
and Alireza Mir Asgari, three former members of MKO interviewed
by Human Rights Watch, witnessed the death of Parviz Ahmadi in
February 1995 inside an internal MKO prison in Iraq. 44
The three shared a prison cell during the security clearance
arrests in February 1995. Parviz Ahmadi was a dissident member
who was held in the same cell. Ali Ghashghavi told Human Rights
Watch that Parviz Ahmadi was taken for interrogations on his
second day of being held in the prison cell:
It was the start of Ramadan
[February 1995] when the prison guards came to fetch Parviz
Ahmadi. He was gone for a couple of hours. When they brought him
back he was badly beaten and died soon afterwards.
Abbas Sadeghinezhad, who was also
present in the cell, recalled the final moments of Parviz
Ahmadi’s life:
The prison door opened, and a
prisoner was thrown into the cell. He fell on his face. At first
we didn’t recognize him. He was beaten up severely. We turned
him around; it was Parviz Ahmadi taken for interrogations just a
few hours before. Ahmadi was a unit commander. His bones were
broken all over, his legs were inflamed; he was falling into a
coma. We tried to help him but after only ten minutes he died as
I was holding his head on my lap. The prison guard opened the
door and pulled Ahmadi’s lifeless body out. 45
Alireza Mir Asgari, who was also
present, corroborated the circumstances of Parviz Ahmadi’s
death. 46
In contrast, the MKO’s publication Mojahed of March 2,
1998, lists Parviz Ahmadi as an MKO “martyr” killed by Iranian
intelligence agents.47
Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human
Rights Watch that he had earlier witnessed the death of another
prisoner, Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an
interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with
Sadeghinejad. 48
[41] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Karim Haqi,
February 11, 2005.
[42] Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Mohammad
Reza Eskandari and Tahereh Eskandari, February 1, 2005 and
February 10, 2005.
[43] Banisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p. 388.
[44] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas
Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005. Human Rights Watch telephone
interview with Ali Ghashghavi, February 9, 2005 and May 6, 2005.
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari,
February 10, 2005.
[45] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas
Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005.
[46] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir
Asgari, February 10, 2005.
[47] Mojahed, No. 380, March 2, 1998 (on file with
Human Rights Watch).
[48] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Abbas
Sadeghinejad, February 14, 2005. |
Mohammad Hussein Sobhani spent
eight-and-a-half years in solitary confinement inside the MKO’s main
camp in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, from September 1992 to January 2001. He was
subsequently held in Abu Ghraib prison and left Iraq in 2002. 49
Sobhani first came in contact with the MKO
in 1977, a year before the anti-monarchy revolution. By 1979, he was
working “professionally and full time” with the organization. When the
headquarters of the armed wing of the organization relocated inside
Iraq, he followed suit. By 1991, he had risen in the ranks of the
organization and had become a member of the Central Committee. However,
ever since the “ideological revolution,” when divorces were mandated, he
became uncomfortable with the path pursued by the leadership. His
differences with the leadership of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi and other
members of the Central Committee reached a climax in 1992. Masoud Rajavi
argued for remaining in Iraq regardless of the end of the Iran-Iraq war
and Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the first Gulf War in 1991, he said.
Rajavi still hoped that fighting between Iran and Iraq would resume, and
based the organization’s strategy on such a development. Sobhani says he
found the possibility of a new war highly unlikely given the dismal
state of Iraq’s armed forces. Other members of the Central Committee saw
his arguments as a challenge to the Rajavis’ leadership:
As long as my criticisms were mild, I was
left alone. But as soon as I persevered in my questioning, their
behavior changed dramatically. In the beginning, I discussed my concerns
personally with the leadership, Maryam and Masoud Rajavi. I also brought
up my concerns with other members of the Central Committee. These
discussions reached a dead-end. Once they became certain that I didn’t
share their views, on August 28, 1992, they convened a meeting (neshast
taiin taklif) to determine my faith and to decide if I was staying
with the organization or not. The process began with intimidation,
verbal abuse, and beatings. Of course, since I was a high ranking
official I was treated better than ordinary members. I was told that my
criticisms and questions were just an excuse to quit the struggle. Their
conclusion was that I was a quitter (borideh) and didn’t have the
strength to continue the struggle any longer. 50
On August 31, 1992, Sobhani was moved to a
prison and kept under solitary confinement for the next eight-and-a-half
years.
After the first two months in prison, all
of my beliefs in the organization fell apart. Up to that point I
considered my differences with them as a matter of divergent political
views; I wasn’t questioning the MKO’s underlying essence. I used to mark
my prison walls each time I was subjected to severe beatings. There were
many occasions of lesser beatings, but on eleven occasions I was beaten
mercilessly using wooden sticks and thick leather belts. 51
Sobhani was handed over to Iraqi officials
in January 2001. He spent one month in mukhabarat prison and
then transferred to Abu Ghraib. He was held in Abu Ghraib until January
21, 2002, when he was repatriated to Iran in exchange for Iraqi POWs. In
Iran, he was detained and interrogated by the Iranian government. After
three days, he escaped from a low security detention center and fled
Iran. He is currently living in Europe.
Yasser Ezati was born on May 27, 1980, to
Hasan Ezati and Akram Ghadim-al-ayam. He said that his father, also
known as Nariman, was a well-known interrogator inside the MKO prisons.
Yasser’s mother died during one of the MKO’s military operations. 52
Ezati moved to Iraq with his family at the
age of three and grew up inside the MKO military camps. During the 1991
Gulf war, Ezati and other children inside the camps were separated from
their parents and sent outside Iraq. During the next three years, Ezati
lived with three different families in Canada. These families were MKO
sympathizers. In the summer of 1994, the MKO moved Ezati to Cologne,
Germany, where he lived in a group-house for the MKO children. The
organization recruited Ezati for military training when he was seventeen
years old and sent him to Iraq in June 1997.
After the first six months in Iraq, I
realized I had no desire to stay. In Europe I had an image of a
democratic organization, but in Iraq I realized the extent of censorship
and control. I wanted to leave. I was repeatedly told the only way out
was to go to Iran. I was too afraid to go to Iran. 53
Ezati was extremely uncomfortable with the
many means of thought control enforced inside the camps. He said there
were many gatherings where high ranking officials lectured members not
to think of any issue except those relating to internal MKO operations.
“We had to write self-criticism reports on a regular basis. If we had
any thoughts outside of the organizational framework we had to report
them,” he said. Ezati’s most daunting experience took place in summer of
2001:
It was a gathering called to’emeh
[lure, or bait] that lasted four consecutive months. All of the camp
members were present during these sessions. At this time the number of
dissidents who wanted to leave the organization was growing daily.
First, Masoud Rajavi talked about the Mojahedin’s basic ideology. He
then talked about the organization’s strategy, and finally he addressed
the issue of those members wishing to separate from the organization.
His purpose was to intimidate members and to say that anyone who wants
to leave is a traitor. These sessions were held from morning to evening.
Dissident members were brought in front of the audience and forced to
self-criticize their actions and thoughts. They were expected to
conclude by saying that they will remain with the organization. As soon
as someone would speak their minds or criticize the organization, the
attendees would attack him/her mercilessly using harsh verbal abuses.
Anyone who dared to ask to leave the organization would immediately be
labeled an agent of the Iranian government. It was psychologically
devastating. I had to pledge my allegiance to the MKO numerous times
during these gatherings. After four consecutive months of psychological
pressures, I ended up signing documents that I would stay with the
organization. 54
After the American occupation of Iraq,
Ezati managed to escape Camp Ashraf in June 2004. He is living in
Europe.
Farhad Javaheri-Yar is a former fighter
with the MKO in Iraq. 55
He served in various capacities in intelligence and security operations.
In 1995, he became aware of dissident members being imprisoned inside
the MKO camps in Iraq. He wrote a letter to his superiors requesting to
be released from his duties and expressed his desire to leave the
organization. His superiors tried repeatedly to intimidate him into
staying. After his refusal, he was incarcerated in various prisons
inside the MKO camps in Iraq from November 1995 to December 2000. He was
subsequently turned over to the Iraqi officials and held in Abu Ghraib
prison until January 2002, when he was repatriated to Iran.
Javaheri-Yar joined the MKO in August 1982
in Tehran and became active in their underground armed resistance. He
was arrested in October 1984 by the Iranian authorities and spent the
following four years inside Evin, Ghazal Hisar, and Gohardasht prisons
in Iran. Upon his release, he contacted MKO operatives in Europe and was
smuggled to Karachi and from there to Iraq. He entered Iraq in 1989 and
became an active member of the MKO’s armed wing.
Javaheri-Yar became disillusioned with the
MKO in 1995 after learning from a number of other MKO cadres that they
had been recently imprisoned by the organization:
In July 1995, I returned to Camp Ashraf
from a reconnaissance mission. During the preceding months, I had
noticed a number of my friends had “disappeared.” I was told that they
were inside Iran to carry out missions. I met two of them, Akbar Akbari
and Ali Taleghani, who told me that they were imprisoned inside Camp
Ashraf during this period and were forced to sign false confessions
indicating their ties to Iranian intelligence agents and [promising]
that they would never leave the MKO.
I could not believe that the Mojahedin
would engage in acts of torture and forced confessions similar to what
the Iranian government used. I wrote a number of reports for my
superior. In these letters I expressed my disapproval of the
mistreatment of members and submitted my resignation. My request was
repeatedly ignored. 56
Javaheri-Yar persevered with his request to
leave the MKO, but was told that the organization could not relieve him
of his duties because of his extensive knowledge of MKO’s activities.
Once Javaheri-Yar realized he would not be free to leave, he escaped
from Camp Ashraf on November 28, 1995 and attempted to reach the
Jordanian border. On November 30, 1995, he was arrested by Iraqi
security forces near the city of Tikrit. He pleaded with the Iraqi
forces not to return him to the MKO camp, but his pleas were ignored and
he was handed over to the MKO forces in Camp Ashraf. During the next
five years he was held in solitary confinement in various locations
inside the MKO camps, from November 1995 to December 2000.
During the first two months, I was kept
inside a pre-fabricated trailer room called a bangal. I was told
that I could not leave the camp but could resume life inside the camp if
I chose to do menial labor, such as making bread or sweeping streets. I
refused their offer, and their response was harsh. I was moved to a
prison cell in Avenue 400 of Camp Ashraf. The cell’s dimensions were
three by two-and-a-half meters [nine feet by eight feet]. It was
connected to a narrow hallway— one meter [three feet] wide and
three-and-a-half meters [ten feet] long—that led to a small toilet and
sink.
In February 1996, I made very loud verbal
protests from inside my cell. To punish me, they confined me inside a
bathroom for three consecutive weeks. I was miserable. There was no room
to stretch or lie down. The tiled floor was wet and cold. It was a
terrifying experience. 57
The MKO’s leadership, including Masoud
Rajavi, promised Javaheri-Yar that he would be released “soon,” but each
time they broke their promise. Javaheri-Yar was imprisoned in solitary
confinement inside Camp Ashraf, as well as Camp Parsian, until December
2000, when he was turned over to the Iraqi intelligence forces (mukhabarat).
He spent one month in a mukhabarat prison before being
transferred to Abu Ghraib prison. He was repatriated to Iran on January
21, 2002. He left Iran and is living in Europe.
Ali Ghashghavi joined the MKO as a fighter
in Iraq in 1989. He was arrested in February 1995 during the “security
clearance” phase and was imprisoned for four months in Camp Ashraf. He
told Human Rights Watch of his experience during this period: 58
One night in January 1995, I was called
over by my superior and told that a member of the Central Committee
wanted me in her office. I was excited to be meeting such a high level
official at such an unlikely hour. I assumed there was much importance
attached to this meeting. We got into a military vehicle; it was around
midnight. They took me to a place inside Camp Ashraf called Iskan.
It is at the far corner of the camp where a series of apartment
buildings were used to house families [before they were forcibly broken
up]. It was a rather isolated spot—barren desert and frighteningly
secluded.
There were a few people inside, five or
six. I was taken to an empty room and told to wait. A few minutes later,
another member, Hussein Nizam, was brought in. Hussein Nazim had spent
many years inside the Islamic Republic’s prisons, so he knew something
else was happening. I was somewhat naive and didn’t have much of a clue.
Suddenly the door opened and a group of
people attacked us mercilessly, blindfolded us, tied our hands behind
our backs, and put us inside a car. We were driven around for half an
hour. We stopped inside an area that was approximately at the center of
the camp. I didn’t know this was a prison until I was taken there. The
prison was on Avenue 400 of Camp Ashraf near the water tanker. Until
then, I had assumed that explosives or sensitive documents were guarded
inside.
Our clothes were taken from us and we put
on prison garb. We were led to a large cell holding nearly twenty-five
prisoners. The prison cell was on the ground floor of the building;
there was a small window near the ceiling for air circulation. A small
toilet and shower were built at one end of the cell.
There was a period when prisoners were
taken on a daily basis for interrogations and beatings. One method was
to kick the prisoner’s legs and knees repeatedly with military boots
with metal covers on the front. Another method was to put a thick rope
around the prisoner’s neck and drag him on the ground. Sometimes
prisoners returned to the cell with extremely swollen necks—their head
and neck as big as a pillow.
I experienced the pain of leg-beatings
firsthand. During one of my interrogation sessions, the interrogator
told me that if I don’t give them guarantees that I will stay with the
leaders forever, he would kill me right there and then. I asked him
“what worthier guarantee there could be than my coming here to join your
ranks and fight against Khomeini?” He replied that now that the
ideological revolution had been instituted and life was harder, people
like me couldn’t bear it and wanted to leave. He said, “I can see it in
your eyes that you are dying to quit the organization.”
He went to the next room while he told me
how he was going to beat me up badly. He changed his shoes and put on
a pair of these military boots. He came back, and two hefty guards held
me. He began kicking my legs repeatedly. My legs are still unbalanced
from these beatings. Interrogations sometimes lasted for up to thirty or
thirty-six hours non-stop.
Ghashghavi was released in May 1995, after
a meeting with Masoud Rajavi who told him, “The judicial branch of the
National Liberation Army has acquitted you.” After this experience
Ghashghavi, explored ways to escape Camp Ashraf. On March 20, 1998, he
was imprisoned for forty-five days and then turned over to Iraqi
intelligence agents. He spent another forty-five days inside the
mukhabarat prison in central Baghdad before being transferred to Abu
Ghraib. He was repatriated to Iran on January 21, 2002. In Iran, he was
interrogated and brought before a court that sentenced him to nine years
in prison. After sixteen months of imprisonment, he was given a
forty-eight hour release to visit his family. He used this opportunity
to escape and leave Iran. In August 2003, he fled Iran and is currently
living in Europe.
Alireza Mir Asgari was a deputy director of
one of the MKO’s military units in 1994 when he started to have concerns
about the organization’s links with the Iraqi military. In January 1995,
he was arrested and imprisoned. In June 1995, he was released after
signing a contract promising to remain with the MKO’s forces. He was
arrested again in 1998 and spent eight months in solitary confinement.
In 2001, he arranged to escape, but his plan was discovered and he was
imprisoned again until 2003, when he was turned over to Iraqi forces who
then abandoned him along the Iran-Iraq border. He described his sudden
arrest in 1995: 59
I was arrested without notice on January
29, 1995. I was told to go to a meeting with a team who were preparing
for operations in Iran. These kinds of discussions were a regular part
of my duties. I was taken to a room and told to wait. Hasan Mohasel, one
of the MKO’s top intelligence officers, came into the room and put a
note in front of me saying that I had been arrested because I was an
agent of Iranian intelligence and had infiltrated the Liberation Army. I
couldn’t believe what was happening; I thought it was a joke and started
to laugh. But Hasan Mohasel cursed me and told me to stand against the
wall. Suddenly two or three more people entered the room and began to
blindfold me and to tie my hands behind my back. I was in total shock.
They put me in a car and drove around for forty-five minutes inside the
camp. I was taken to a building; I didn’t know where it was. Hasan Sadat
Darbandi, also known as Adel, removed my blindfold and threw me into a
cell with many other prisoners. I could not believe it; I thought there
had been a coup inside the organization. Each day, a number of prisoners
were taken for interrogation. They were beaten badly; after they were
brought back, their heads and faces were tremendously swollen.
After a couple of days, it was my turn to
be taken for interrogation. They asked me why I had joined the MKO. I
told them I came here to fight Khomeini’s government, but they said that
wasn’t true. During the first couple of days of interrogation, they beat
me mercilessly. It was very depressing; I really wanted to commit
suicide. I was only seventeen years old when I left Iran and came to
Iraq to join the MKO. I had spent my entire adult life in their camps.
Eventually, I gave up and agreed to sign
the forced confessions stating that I had ties to Iranian intelligence.
I was taken to a meeting with Masoud Rajavi, who told me that if I
stayed for another two years, they would release me and send me to
Spain.
Mir Asgari was released in June 1995. He
spent the next two years waiting for the organization to release and
transfer him to Spain. However, he was told that because of his wealth
of information, he could not be released. His protests led to his
imprisonment again:
On March 25, 1998, I was taken to a prison
where my old case from 1995 was reopened. They said that based on my own
confession, I was an Iranian agent and could not be trusted. I spent
eight months in solitary confinement. During this period, I was told
that my sister in Iran had been arrested and executed. Later I found
this to be untrue. 60
After recanting his request to leave Iraq,
Mir Asgari was released. Since the organization was not going to allow
him to leave, he started to design an escape plan. His plan to escape
was discovered, and he was arrested again. He was kept in solitary
confinement for nearly two years, from 2001 to 2003. A few months prior
to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in February 2003, Mir Asgari was turned
over to the Iraqi forces who took him to the Iran-Iraq border along the
Arvandrood River [Shatt al-Arab] and released him there. He is living in
Europe.
Akbar Akbari became familiar with the MKO
on the eve of the Iranian revolution in 1978. He started his
professional association with the MKO in February 1979. In June 1984, he
was arrested by the Iranian authorities and was imprisoned in Iran for
more than four years. Within a few months of his release in September
1988, Akbari left Iran to join the MKO operations in Iraq. 61
In 1993, he decided to leave the
organization and wrote a number of letters to his superiors asking to be
released.
My supervisor was Mehdi Abrishamchi, who
was one of the high ranking members of the Central Committee. After I
wrote him a letter expressing my intention to leave the organization, he
called me to his office, tore the letter into pieces, threw it in a
garbage basket, and said, “I don’t want to hear of this anymore. You are
not to discuss it with anyone.” I was also called to private meetings
with other high ranking members who reinforced the same message. 62
Akbari was supervisor of a section in
Communications Department (Setad Ravabit). He carried out many
sensitive tasks for the organization, including working as a personal
body guard of Masoud Rajavi. Akbari was arrested in December 1993 and
held inside a prison in Camp Ashraf.
The interrogators were extremely rough.
From the moment I entered the room, I was subjected to beatings. I was
put on a chair that was fixed to the floor. My hands and feet were tied
to the chair, I couldn’t move at all. I was beaten with a thick hose and
kicked repeatedly with a military boot. My interrogator also used a pair
of heavy plastic slippers to hit me in the face and head.
I was asked to confess to being an agent of
the Iranian government. After a few interrogation sessions, the
interrogator dictated a confession letter that he asked me to sign. Then
he told me, “Now it is proven that you are an agent who has infiltrated
our organization.” 63
Akbari was then taken with a group of
prisoners to meet Masoud Rajavi. Rajavi told them that he had “forgiven”
them and they could return to their duties. He was let out of the prison
in June 1995. Akbari escaped Camp Ashraf in February 1998 and set out
for the Jordanian border. He was arrested by Iraqi security forces in
Ramadi and handed over to the MKO.
When I was returned to Camp Ashraf, I was
taken to a room where Hasan Mohasel told me I would be imprisoned
because I was an infiltrator. High ranking members of the organization
were present. I was taken to a fort called Ghaleh Afsaneh and kept in
solitary confinement for a full year, from February 1998 to March 1999. 64
In March 1999, Akbari was turned over to
Iraqi security forces who took him to Abu Ghraib. Akbari was in Abu
Ghraib until January 21, 2002, when he was repatriated to Iran in
exchange for Iraqi POWs. He was detained and interrogated by the Iranian
authorities. He said that during a weekend release to visit his family,
he escaped and fled Iran. He is now living in Europe.
Sayed Amir Mowaseghi joined the MKO in 1984
and was imprisoned by the Iranian authorities from 1984-1987. After his
release, he went to Pakistan, and from there was able to travel to Iraq,
where he joined the MKO forces in June 1988. 65
In 2001, he chose to leave the
organization, but was not allowed. A “court session” was convened in
September 2001 in the presence of Maryam and Masoud Rajavi, who refused
to grant him permission to leave. Subsequently, he was subjected to
verbal abuse and humiliation:
I was taken to a large gathering of nearly
600 people. They led me through the crowd; I was spat on, kicked and
verbally abused. I was moved to a trailer, they called it bangal,
and kept there in solitary confinement until June 2, 2002, when I was
handed over to the Iraqi forces. The Iraqis took me to Abu Ghraib, and I
remained there until I was repatriated to Iran on 18 March 2003. 66
[49]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mohammad Hussein Sobhani,
February 14, 2005 and May 6, 2005.
[50]
Ibid.
[51]
Ibid.
[52]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yasser Ezati, February 9,
2005.
[53]
Ibid.
[54]
Ibid.
[55]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Farhad Javaheri-Yar,
February 3, 2005 and February 25, 2005.
[56]
Ibid.
[57]
Ibid.
[58]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ali Ghashghavi, February 9,
2005 and May 6, 2005.
[59]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, February
10, 2005.
[60]
Ibid.
[61]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Akbar Akbari, February 27,
2005 and May 6, 2005.
[62]
Ibid.
[63]
Ibid.
[64]
Bid.
[65]
Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Seyd Amir Mowaseghi,
February 4, 2005.
[66]
Ibid.
|